

WHY IS THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL SO DANGEROUS? FACT SHEET

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What we were promised:

“The deal we’ll accept is they [Iran] end their nuclear program. It’s very straightforward.”

– President Barack Obama, October 22, 2012¹

“I want to be very clear there’s nothing in this agreement or document that grants Iran a right to enrich. We’ve been very clear that given its past behavior, and given existing U.N. resolutions and previous violations by Iran of its international obligations, that we don’t recognize such a right.”

– President Obama, December 7, 2013²

“We expect to have anywhere, anytime access” to Iran’s nuclear facilities for inspection.

– Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, April 20, 2015³

“No deal is better than a bad deal.”

– President Obama, December 7, 2013⁴

“President Obama has been crystal clear. Don’t rush. We’re not in a rush. We need to get the right deal. No deal is better than a bad deal.”

– Secretary of State John Kerry, November 10, 2013⁵

“To get there we will have to be tough, clear-eyed and ready to walk away and increase the pressure if need be. No deal is better than a bad deal.”

– Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, May 14, 2014⁶

What we got:

As documented below, the final deal does not end Iran’s nuclear program.

Rather, the deal – known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the attendant U.N Security Council Resolution 2231 – preserves and makes legal Iran’s illegal nuclear program and allows for its dramatic expansion.

The deal does not reject Iran the “right” to enrich uranium.

Rather, the deal grants Iran the right to enrich uranium. Indeed, it allows Iran to continue research and development and faster and more sophisticated centrifuges.

The deal does not provide for “anywhere, anytime” inspections.

Rather, the deal gives Iran at least 24 days before inspectors can enter a nuclear facility suspected of violations. What's more, the deal does not allow inspectors to enter Iranian military bases and facilities.

The deal eventually removes all sanctions, inspections, monitors and restrictions from Iran's nuclear program.

The deal will also permit Iran to buy, sell and transfer conventional weapons, ballistic missile technology, and sensitive, dual-use technology that could be used to build nuclear weapons.

Constitutional Considerations:

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution states: "The President... shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur..."⁷

This final Iran deal is clearly an international treaty and should be handled as such.

The President and his advisors seriously erred by refusing to submit the deal to Congress as a treaty, in violation of the Constitution.

The President also could have submitted the deal to Congress as a "binding executive agreement" requiring a simple-majority vote of both the House and the Senate to approve it.

Instead, the President is handling the final Iran deal as a "non-binding executive agreement" which does not require Congressional approval.

"We've been clear from the beginning: We're not negotiating a, quote, legally binding plan," Secretary Kerry has said.⁸

What's more, the President did an end-run around the American people and their representatives in Congress by submitting the deal to the U.N. Security Council and securing a unanimous vote.

The Congress also seriously erred by passing the Corker-Cardin bill, which created a mechanism for Congress to approve or disapprove the Iran deal other than by the Constitutionally-prescribed path.⁹ The Corker-Cardin bill passed 98 to 1. Only Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark) voted against the bill, and he did so on solid Constitutional grounds. "A nuclear-arms agreement with any adversary – especially the terror-sponsoring, Islamist Iranian regime – should be submitted as a treaty and obtain a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate as required by the Constitution," Sen. Cotton said. Sen. Cotton is right.

The Senate should correct this mistake. It should deem the Iran deal as a treaty and hold a vote in accordance with the Constitution. If 67 Members of the U.S. Senate do not ratify the Iran deal, then the deal should not have the force of U.S. law.

NOTE: The Obama administration explained why it is not handling the Iran deal as a treaty – it does not believe the deal could pass with a bipartisan, two-thirds majority.

REP. REID RIBBLE (R-WI): For 228 years, the Constitution allowed treaties to [pass] with the advice and consent of 67 U.S. Senators. Why is this not considered a treaty?

SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY: Well Congressman, I spent quite a few years trying to get a lot of treaties through the United States Senate, and it has become physically impossible. That's why. Because you can't pass a treaty anymore. It has become impossible to schedule, to pass, and I sat there leading the charge on the Disabilities Treaty which fell to basically ideology and politics. So I think that is the reason why.¹⁰

Here are the facts about the final Iran deal:

President Obama promised that Iran would never be granted the right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.

- On December 7, 2013, discussing an initial agreement with Iran over nuclear negotiations, President Obama stated: “With respect to the end state [of negotiations], I want to be very clear there's nothing in this agreement or document that grants Iran a right to enrich. We've been very clear that given its past behavior, and given existing U.N. resolutions and previous violations by Iran of its international obligations, that we don't recognize such a right.”¹¹

The final deal, however, grants Iran the right to enrich uranium on its soil, a “right” Iran insisted by affirmed by the international community from the beginning of the negotiations.

- “If the right to enrich isn't acknowledged, there won't be a deal,” an Iranian diplomat told the *Wall Street Journal*.¹²
- Iran agreed to the first interim deal – the Geneva Accord – in 2013 because the West conceded to Iran the right to enrich uranium on its soil.¹³
- The final deal grants Iran the freedom to enrich uranium, does not require Iran to destroy or dismantle its enrichment facilities, and even permits Iran the ability to develop even faster and more advanced enrichment technology.¹⁴

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has publicly boasted how Iran got everything it wanted from the deal and much, much more. Here are excerpts of a televised speech he delivered to the nation on July 14:¹⁵

- “Our objective was to have the nuclear program and have sanctions lifted.
- “At first they wanted us to have 100 centrifuges; now we will have 6,000.
- “They wanted restrictions of 25 years; now it's 8.
- “First they said we could only have IR1 centrifuges, now we can have IR6, 7 and 8, advanced centrifuges.

- “[At first they said our] heavy water plant at Arak had to be dismantled; but now it will remain with heavy water under conditions.
- “[At first they said the nuclear facility at] Fordow had to be closed; now we will have 1,000 centrifuges there....
- “In future days when United Nations Security Council comes with a new resolution, all 6 of their previous resolutions will be lifted....
- “Honorable Iranian nationals, all sanctions, including on missiles, will be lifted on days of implementation. Not suspended, lifted!
- “Today is the end of oppressive sanctions. The chain of sanctions is broken....
- “Today people in Lebanon and Palestine are happy because Zionists have tried to block this deal but failed....
- “Oh great nation of Iran this is the beginning of a new movement, I tell you!”

“Obama’s Iran deal falls far short of his own goals,” notes the editorial board of the Washington Post.¹⁶

- “None of Iran’s nuclear facilities — including the Fordow center buried under a mountain — will be closed.
- “Not one of the country’s 19,000 centrifuges will be dismantled. Tehran’s existing stockpile of enriched uranium will be “reduced” but not necessarily shipped out of the country.
- “In effect, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will remain intact, though some of it will be mothballed for 10 years.
- “When the accord lapses, the Islamic republic will instantly become a threshold nuclear state....
- “The proposed accord will provide Iran a huge economic boost that will allow it to wage more aggressively the wars it is already fighting or sponsoring across the region....
- “The agreement is based on a theoretical benchmark: that Iran would need at least a year to produce fissile material sufficient for a weapon, compared with two months or less now.”

President Obama says he does not trust Iran, but the final deal assures that the world can verify that Iran is keeping all aspects of the deal.

- *“[T]he best way for us to assure it is for us to test this [diplomatic] path, understanding it is not based on trust. It’s based on what we can verify.”* – President Obama, December 7, 2013¹⁷
- *“I think it’s important for us to stay focused on the problem at hand. And the specific problem that is being debated right now is not whether we trust the Iranian regime or not -- we don’t trust them.”* – President Obama, March 3, 2015¹⁸
- *“This deal is not built on trust; it is built on verification. Inspectors will have 24/7 access to Iran’s key nuclear facilities.”* – President Obama, July 14, 2015¹⁹

As part of that verification process to prevent Iran the ability to cheat on the deal and break out to The Bomb, President Obama and his advisors told us that IAEA inspectors would be allowed to have “anywhere, anytime” inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities.

- President Obama stated on April 2, 2015: “International inspectors will have unprecedented access not only to Iranian nuclear facilities, but to the entire supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program -- from uranium mills that provide the raw materials, to the centrifuge production and storage facilities that support the program. If Iran cheats, the world will know it. If we see something suspicious, we will inspect it. Iran’s past efforts to weaponize its program will be addressed. With this deal, Iran will face more inspections than any other country in the world.”²⁰
- Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz stated on April 20, 2015: “We expect to have anywhere, anytime access” to Iran’s nuclear facilities.²¹
- Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes stated plainly that the deal provides “anywhere, anytime” inspections.
 - “So the Israelis have put out this list of things that they think should be in the final deal with Iran, including allowing inspectors to go anywhere, anytime. That seems perfectly reasonable, no?” CNN anchor Jack Tapper asked the White House Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes on April 6, 2015.²²
- “Well, Jake, first of all, under this deal, you will have anywhere, anytime 24/7 access as it relates to the nuclear facilities that Iran has,” Rhodes replied.

The final deal, however, does not allow for “anywhere, anytime” inspections – rather the deal allows Iran to stall for at least 24 days before allowing IAEA inspectors into facilities suspected of violations. A lot of illegal and dangerous activity can be hidden or obscured by people who have at least 24 days to cover their tracks.²³

Secretary Kerry now says he has never heard of the concept of “anywhere, anytime” inspections.²⁴

- “In an interview with CBS’ ‘Face the Nation’ that aired Sunday, Kerry argued that having ‘anytime, anywhere’ access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites was ‘not on the table’ and a term ‘I never heard in the four years that we were negotiating’ -- even though, as host John Dickerson pointed out, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said in April that the international community would have ‘anywhere, anytime, 24/7 access.’”
- “This is a term that, honestly, I never heard in the four years that we were negotiating. It was not on the table. There’s no such thing in arms control as

anytime, anywhere. There isn't any nation in the world, none that has an anytime, anywhere,” Kerry said.

The Obama administration told us that inspectors would be allowed to enter Iranian military facilities suspected of violations.

- “What about the military facilities?” asked CNN’s Jake Tapper on April 6, 2015.²⁵
- “What we will have under this deal, Jake, is the strongest inspections regime that any country faces in the world,” said Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes. “And what that means is if we see a site that we need to inspect on a military facility, we can get access to that site and inspect it. So if it’s a suspicious site that we believe is related to its nuclear efforts, we can get access and inspect that site through the IAEA.”

The final deal, however, does not allow international inspectors to enter Iranian military facilities at all – this means that Iran could be careful not to conduct any weaponization efforts at its official nuclear sites, but could actually build nuclear warheads on military bases and in other military facilities away from the eyes of international inspectors.

- “‘The access of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency or from any other body to Iran’s military centers is forbidden,’ Ali Akbar Velayati, Khamenei’s adviser for international affairs, said in an interview with Al-Jazeera satellite TV. Velayati further stressed that the directive will be enforced regardless of interpretations by the P5+1 world powers to the contrary.”²⁶
- Iran’s Foreign Minister reaffirmed this point in an address to Iran’s parliament.²⁷

Iran has negotiated a series of secret side deals with the IAEA that are not part of the final, formal, public nuclear agreement, and neither President Obama nor Secretary Kerry has been allowed to read these deals.

- The President knew of their existence, but did not inform Congress of the deals, and Members of Congress were not allowed to see these secret side deals, according to a column in the *Washington Post*.²⁸
- “The agreements were uncovered, completely by chance, by two members of Congress — Rep. Mike Pompeo (R-Kan.) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) — who were in Vienna meeting with the U.N.-related agency.
- “Pompeo [said] that he and Cotton were meeting with the deputy director of the IAEA and the agency’s two top Iran negotiators just days after the nuclear accord was announced, when they asked how the agency will carry out verification at the Iranian military complex at Parchin. IAEA officials told them, quite casually, that the details were all covered in agreements negotiated between the IAEA and the Iranian government. It was the first they had heard of the side deals.
- “Pompeo says they asked whether they could see those agreements. He says IAEA officials replied, “‘Oh no, of course not, no, you’re not going to get to see those.’ And so everybody on our side of the table asked, ‘Has Secretary Kerry seen

these?’ ‘No, Secretary Kerry hasn’t seen them. No American is ever going to get to see them.’ ”

One secret side deal apparently allows Iranian officials – not international inspectors -- to collect their own soil samples at key nuclear facilities suspected of violations. When Secretary Kerry was confronted about this during a Senate hearing, he did not deny this. Rather, he said these and other side deals (not included in the final official text) are “classified” agreements and will not be disclosed to the American people.

The final deal will provide Iran more cash than all of the U.S. aid provided to Israel since 1948 -- “The Iran deal will provide Iran with a cash windfall as sanctions are eased and assets are unfrozen. The total amount is estimated to be as high as \$150 billion. If so, the Iran deal would give more cash to Iran than the \$124.3 billion the U.S. has given in total aid to Israel since 1948.”²⁹

The final deal will, in time, remove all restrictions from Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, and will permit Iran to legally buy conventional weapons, ballistic missile technology and sensitive, dual-use technology that could be used to build nuclear weapons.

- According to an analysis of the final deal conducted by Dennis Ross, a former senior advisor to President Obama on Iran issues, and co-chairman of a team of leading Middle East and nuclear experts: ³⁰
 - “Iran could begin ramping up latent enrichment capacity after 8.5 years....
 - “Iran is permitted to build additional yellowcake production and uranium conversion facilities....
 - “Iran can conduct enrichment R&D with uranium in advanced centrifuges at Natanz....
 - “After 10 years, Iran will be able to begin installing and operating up to approximately 50,000 centrifuges at Natanz – more than five times the current amount – including advanced machines made far more efficient by the enrichment R&D and centrifuge manufacturing plans permitted under the JCPA.
 - “After 15 years, Iran is permitted to build as large an industrial nuclear program as it chooses.
 - “Iran is also permitted R&D at Fordow, using elements other than uranium....
 - “After 15 years, Iran would have no limits on enrichment at Fordow.
 - “After 15 years, Iran would have no limits on stockpile size or enrichment level....
 - “Termination of existing UNSCRs would lift the embargo on transfers of arms and sensitive technology to and from Iran.
 - “The arms embargo on conventional weaponry expires after 5 years.
 - “Restrictions on the transfer of ballistic missile technology expire after 8 years....”

- According to an analysis of the final deal by Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: ³¹
 - “UNSCR 2231 bans arms transfers by Iran without the permission of the UN Security Council until the ban is lifted in five years.
 - “Iran rejects this restriction.
 - “Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has stated on Iranian state TV that ‘we will provide weapons to whomever and whenever we consider appropriate. And we will buy weapons from wherever we can.’
 - “Likewise, on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, Supreme Leader Khamenei vowed regarding the JCPOA that Iran ‘will never give in to the enemy's greed in the area of protecting its defense capabilities and security—particularly in this environment filled with the enemies' threats,’ nor would it ‘abandon our regional friends: the oppressed people of Palestine, the oppressed people of Yemen, the people and government of Syria, the people and government of Iraq, the oppressed people of Bahrain and the sincere mujahids of the Resistance in Lebanon and Palestine. These people will always enjoy our support.’ He continued, saying that ‘our policy towards the arrogant government of America will not change in any way despite these negotiations and the document that has been prepared.’....
 - “Iran has successfully transferred arms to its regional proxies and allies for years, even though it was prohibited from doing so by UNSCR 1701 (2006), which banned arms transfers to Hezbollah, and UNSCRs 1747 (2007) and 1929 (2010), which banned all Iranian arms exports. Iran will almost certainly continue to export arms to its proxies and allies by all ways and means available to it....
 - “UNSCR 2231 bans the sale of major weapons systems to Iran without the approval of the UN Security Council until the ban is lifted five years hence. Iran claims that this ban—located in an annex to the UNSCR—lacks legal standing, and that it will fight it. To this end, it will likely try to acquire major weapons systems from foreign sellers—such as the S-300 surface-to-air missile that it contracted for from Russia in 2007—in order to test the provisions of the UNSCR and impose its interpretation of the resolution on the international community....
 - “UNSCR 2231 calls upon Iran to avoid the testing and development of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons for eight years after ‘Adoption Day,’ although there is no prescribed penalty for it continuing with such activities (Annex B, Article 3). Iran claims that since it does not seek nuclear weapons, none of its missiles are designed for this purpose, and consequently, this article is null and void. Moreover,

although Iran recently unveiled a land attack cruise missile...UNSCR 2231 is silent on the testing and development of cruise missiles....”

Despite all of these enormous concessions, even President Obama concedes that the final deal still leaves Iran just one year away from building a nuclear weapon over the next ten years. After that, Iran would be legally free to build a much more robust nuclear program, free from economic sanctions, with the 190,000 centrifuges it wants.

- President Obama on April 2, 2015: “Today, estimates indicate that Iran is only two or three months away from potentially acquiring the raw materials that could be used for a single nuclear bomb. Under this deal, Iran has agreed that it will not stockpile the materials needed to build a weapon. Even if it violated the deal, for the next decade at least, Iran would be a minimum of a year away from acquiring enough material for a bomb.”³²
- Ayatollah Khamenei on July 8, 2014: “Our officials say we need 190,000 [centrifuges]. Perhaps not today, but in two to five years that is the country's absolute need,” Khamenei, who has the final word on all matters of state, was quoted as saying.”³³

Conclusion:

The final Iran deal is a bad deal, one that is dangerous for the American people, for the world, and particularly for our Israeli and Arab allies in the Middle East. It should be rejected by Congress on a broad bipartisan basis and vigorously countered by the next President of the United States for three main reasons:

First, the final Iran deal crosses President Obama’s own red lines.

- It does not end Iran’s nuclear program, as the Obama administrated promised.
- It does not provide for “anywhere, anytime” inspections, as the Obama administration promised.
- It grants Iran a “right” to enrich uranium despite years of Iran’s duplicitous nuclear activity, despite President Obama’s promise not to grant such right.

Second, the final Iran deal does not block Iran’s path to build and deploy nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them – to the contrary, it puts Iran on the legal path to building and deploying The Bomb in eight to ten years, or much sooner if the Iranian regime decides to cheat.

- According to an analysis of the final deal conducted by Dennis Ross, a former senior advisor to President Obama on Iran issues, and co-chairman of a team of other leading Middle East and nuclear experts: “The deal would essentially legitimize Iran as a threshold nuclear state after the sunset....There are no clear mechanisms that would remain after the sunset to ensure Iran adheres to its NPT obligations and is unable to develop nuclear weapons capability.”³⁴

- According to an analysis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: “The nuclear accord does not block Iran's path to the bomb; at best, it may defer the problem for an indeterminate amount of time.”³⁵

Third, the final Iran deal rewards the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism -- a regime that has repeatedly attacked its neighbors, a regime that has repeatedly called for the annihilation of the United States and Israel, and a regime that has repeatedly deceived the international community and repeatedly violated international law with regards to its nuclear program -- with more than \$150 billion in cash and business contracts that will embolden them and provide more resources for international terrorism and spreading their Islamic Revolution.

-- END --

APPENDIX I – Is the U.S. and our European allies required to defend Iranian nuclear facilities from Israeli sabotage or attack?

Excerpts from Article 10, Annex III, of the final deal:³⁶

- “E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices....
- “Co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems;
- “Co-operation through training and workshops to strengthen Iran’s ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.”

Excerpts from dialogue between Sen. Marco Rubio and Sec. Kerry during a hearing on the Iran deal:³⁷

MARCO RUBIO: There is a section titled "Nuclear Security."

And the document states that those who negotiated the deal are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices.

There's a provision, 10.2 that reads: **"Cooperation through training or workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to protect against or respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage. As well as to enable successful and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems."**

Here's my question: If Israel decides it doesn't like this deal and it wants to sabotage an Iranian nuclear program or facility, does this deal that we have just signed obligate us to help Iran defend itself against Israeli sabotage, or for that matter the sabotage of any other country in the world?

SECRETARY OF ENERGY MONIZ: The --I believe that refers to things like physical security and safeguards I think all of our options and those of our allies and friends would remain in place.

RUBIO: **I guess that is my point. If Israel conducts an air strike against a physical facility, does this deal, the way I read it, does it require us to help Iran "protect and respond" to that threat?**

SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY: No.

RUBIO: It does not?

KERRY: The purpose of that is to be able to have longer term guarantees as we enter a world in which cyber warfare is increasingly a concern for everybody, that if you are going to have a nuclear capacities you clearly want to be able to make sure they are adequately protected. I assure you we will coordinate with Israel....

RUBIO: So if Israel conducts a cyber-attack on the Iranian nuclear program, are we obligated to help them defend themselves against the Israeli cyber-attack?

KERRY: No, I assure you we will be cooperating with Israel...

RUBIO: That's not how I read this.

APPENDIX II – Is Iran allowed to collect its own soil samples at nuclear sites suspected of violations, rather than international inspectors being responsible for collecting the samples themselves?

Excerpts from dialogue between Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Sec. Kerry during a Senate Foreign Relations hearing on the Iran deal:³⁸

“Is it true that the Iranians are going to be able to take the samples [at Parchin] as Senator Risch said? Because chain of custody means nothing [if] at the very beginning what you [are] going to get is chosen and derived by the perpetrator,” Menendez said.

“As you know, that is a classified component of this. It’s supposed to be discussed in a classified session,” Kerry responded, adding that [Energy Secretary Ernest] Moniz could brief Menendez about the issue.

“It’s part of a confidential agreement between the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and Iran as to how they do that,” Kerry continued, apparently defending the terms of the Iran-IAEA agreement. “The IAEA has said that they are satisfied that they will be able to do this in a way that does not compromise their needs and that adequately gets the answers they need.

“I’m not confirming how it’s happening,” he quickly added. “I’m saying that we are confident that the IAEA has the ability to get the answers that they need.”

APPENDIX III – How many days does Iran have to stall to keep IAEA inspectors from entering nuclear sites, and what happens if violations of the nuclear deal are identified?

Analysis by Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy:³⁹

- **When will inspectors get into suspect sites?** According to my read of the agreement, Iran has a total of 24 days to delay any set of inspections. While it may take more than 24 days to scrub clean a massive underground enrichment facility, there is a lot of illicit activity that Iran can hide with 24 days' notice.
- **What are the consequences for Iranian violations?** According to my read of the agreement, there is only one penalty for any infraction, big or small -- taking Iran to the UN Security Council for the "snapback" of international sanctions. That is like saying that for any crime -- whether a misdemeanor or a felony -- the punishment is the death penalty. In the real world, that means there will be no punishments for anything less than a capital crime.
- **What does "snapback" mean in practice?** Let's say that the UN Security Council does order the re-imposition of sanctions. According to my read of the agreement, all contracts signed by Iran up until that point are grandfathered in and immune from sanctions. That means one can expect a stampede of state-to-state and private sector contracts -- some real, many hypothetical -- all designed to shield Iran from the impact of possible re-imposition of sanctions, thereby weakening the impact of the punishment.
- **But the problem with snapback gets worse.** The agreement includes a statement that Iran considers a re-imposition of sanctions as freeing it from all commitments and restrictions under the deal. In other words, the violation would have to be really big for the Security Council to blow up the agreement and re-impose sanctions. That effectively gives Iran a free pass on all manner of small to mid-level violations.

ENDNOTES:

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- ¹ Comments by President Obama during debate with Governor Romney, full debate transcript, October 22, 2012, <http://debates.org/index.php?page=october-22-2012-the-third-obama-romney-presidential-debate>.
- ² Transcript of President Obama's conversation at the Saban Forum in Washington, D.C., December 7, 2013, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/07/remarks-president-conversation-saban-forum>.
- ³ Jim Snyder, "Inspectors Need Full Access in Iran Nuclear Deal, Moniz Says," Bloomberg, April 20, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-20/inspectors-need-full-access-in-any-iran-nuclear-deal-moniz-says>.
- ⁴ Transcript of President Obama's conversation at the Saban Forum in Washington, D.C., December 7, 2013, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/07/remarks-president-conversation-saban-forum>.
- ⁵ Tom Curry, "No deal better than a bad deal, Kerry says after failure of talks with Iran," NBC News, November 10, 2013, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/no-deal-better-bad-deal-kerry-says-after-failure-talks-f2D11573241>. For a series of 20 video clips of Kerry and other administration officials repeating this point, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqIMF-eOL1U>.
- ⁶ "Hillary Clinton: No Deal Better Than 'Bad Deal' With Iran," Associated Press, May 14, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/14/hillary-clinton-iran_n_5323991.html.
- ⁷ See U.S. Senate web page explaining the Constitutional language on treaties and the history of the Senate's handling of treaties, <http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm>.
- ⁸ Felicia Schwartz, "Iran Nuclear Deal, If Reached, Wouldn't Be 'Legally Binding,' Kerry Says," Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-deal-if-reached-wouldnt-be-legally-binding-kerry-says-1426115097>.
- ⁹ See Jordain Carney, "Senate overwhelmingly approves Iran review bill in 98-1 vote," The Hill, May 7, 2015, <http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/241355-senate-votes-to-approve-iran-review-bill>.
- ¹⁰ "John Kerry Explains Why Iran Deal Is Not Legally A Treaty: 'You Can't Pass A Treaty Anymore,'" Real Clear Politics, July 29, 2015, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/07/29/john_kerry_explains_why_iran_deal_is_not_a_treaty_you_cant_pass_a_treaty_anymore.html.
- ¹¹ Transcript of President Obama's conversation at the Saban Forum in Washington, D.C., December 7, 2013, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/07/remarks-president-conversation-saban-forum>.
- ¹² Jay Solomon and Laurence Norman, "Iran Deal Stuck Over Uranium Enrichment," Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2013.
- ¹³ "Final Iran deal needs to balance out the concessions," Washington Post editorial, November 28, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/final-iran-deal-needs-to-balance-out-the-concessions/2013/11/28/72741e92-5772-11e3-835d-e7173847c7cc_story.html.
- ¹⁴ Dennis Ross, et al, "Scorecard for the Final Deal with Iran," JINSA, July 29, 2015, <http://www.jinsa.org/publications/scorecard-final-deal-iran>.
- ¹⁵ These remarks were reported via [Twitter](#) by Thomas Erdbrink, the *New York Times*' correspondent in Tehran. Cited on Rosenberg blog, July 18, 2015, <https://flashtrafficblog.wordpress.com/2015/07/18/irans-president-goes-on-tv-to-tell-his-nation-iran-got-everything-it-wanted-from-nuclear-deal-and-much-more/>.
- ¹⁶ "Obama's Iran deal falls far short of his own goals," editorial, Washington Post, April 2, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-iran-deal-falls-well-short-of-his-own-goals/2015/04/02/7974413c-d95c-11e4-b3f2-607bd612aeac_story.html.
- ¹⁷ Ben Wolfgang, "Obama tries to calm Israeli fears over Iranian nuke deal 'not based on trust'," Washington Times, December 7, 2013, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/7/obama-tries-calm-israeli-fears-over-iranian-nuke-d/>.
- ¹⁸ "Remarks by the President Before Meeting with Secretary of Defense Carter," White House transcript, March 3, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/03/remarks-president-meeting-secretary-defense-carter>.
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